Orders of intentionality

Reference definition of orders of intentionality and related recursive mindreading terms used in the literature and in this repository.

What this term means (as used in the literature)

Orders of intentionality are a way to describe the recursive embedding of mental states in a representation (e.g., “I think that you believe that…”), where the order is the number of distinct embedded mind-states in the chain. (Dennett, 1983, DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00016393; Lewis et al., 2017, DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034)

This idea is often discussed under mentalising / mindreading / theory of mind (ToM) as recursive understanding of mental states. (Lewis et al., 2017, DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034)

  • Mentalising / mindreading / Theory of Mind (ToM): Ability to infer others’ mental states and recognize that mental states can affect behavior. (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00076512; Lewis et al., 2017, DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034)
  • Formal Theory of Mind (false-belief competence): In at least one established framing, “formal” ToM is discussed as recognizing false belief and is equated with second-order intentionality (“I believe that you think … even when I know it isn’t true”). (Lewis et al., 2017, DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034)
  • Second-order false belief: A classic developmental formulation of second-order belief understanding appears in the literature on second-order false-belief reasoning. (Perner & Wimmer, 1985, DOI: 10.1016/0022-0965(85)90051-7)

Why this reference page exists (scope)

This page defines orders of intentionality as a terminology anchor for the repository, so that when other pages discuss “first/second/higher-order” mental-state reasoning, they can link here instead of redefining the concept. (Dennett, 1983, DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00016393; Lewis et al., 2017, DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034)

References (primary / peer-reviewed)

  • Dennett, D. C. (1983). Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The “Panglossian paradigm” defended. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00016393
  • Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00076512
  • Lewis, P. A., Birch, A., Hall, A., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2017). Higher order intentionality tasks are cognitively more demanding. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. DOI: 10.1093/scan/nsx034
  • Perner, J., & Wimmer, H. (1985). “John thinks that Mary thinks…” Attribution of second-order beliefs by 5- to 10-year-old children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0965(85)90051-7